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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
The Case for Consumer-Based Use Tax Enforcement
by Adam Thimmesch, David Gamage, and Darien Shanske
The debates regarding use tax enforcement 
and the collection of “online sales tax” can 
sometimes seem stale. The revenue problems 
created by Quill1 and the failure of Congress to 
respond are well known. Notwithstanding these 
realities, though, there is still significant ground 
to be covered on the use tax question. The 
problems related to the collection and 
enforcement of consumption taxes in the 
modern world are not going away, and these 
problems will continue to raise difficulties for 
our tax systems and their enforcement.
This essay provides a fresh look at the use 
tax issue by taking a somewhat different 
approach. Most analyses of the use tax focus on 
the relationship between states and remote 
vendors, but that approach ignores a very 
significant party — the in-state consumer.2 
Consumer compliance has been largely ignored 
in the literature because it has generally been 
assumed that consumers will never 
meaningfully self-report their use tax liabilities.3 
But it is our view that this assumption may be 
partially in error and should not end the 
inquiry. Attention to in-state consumers’ use tax 
compliance is not only warranted, but may be 
critical for the future of consumption tax 
enforcement.
This essay is the first in a planned series that 
introduces several considerations supporting 
the view articulated above. Two sets of 
considerations will be discussed in this essay: 
Adam Thimmesch is 
a professor at the 
University of 
Nebraska College of 
Law. David Gamage is 
a professor of law at 
Indiana University’s 
Maurer School of Law, 
and Darien Shanske is 
a professor at the 
University of 
California Davis 
School of Law (King 
Hall).
In this article, Thimmesch, Gamage, and 
Shanske make the case that attention to in-state 
consumers’ use tax compliance is not only 
warranted but may be critical for the future of 
consumption tax enforcement.
1
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
2
Much of this essay summarizes and expands upon two prior 
pieces on the state use tax by one of the authors of this essay. See 
Adam B. Thimmesch, “Taxing Honesty,” 118 W. Va. L. Rev. 147 
(2015); and Thimmesch, “Testing the Models of Tax Compliance: 
The Use-Tax Experiment,” 2015 Utah L. Rev. 1083 (2015).
3
Joel Slemrod, “Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax 
Evasion,” 21 J. of Econ. Perspectives 25, 37 (2007) (stating the opinion 
that use taxes are “largely unenforceable”).
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(1) economic and (2) rule of law considerations. 
Planned future essays will consider consumer-
focused approaches from a psychological and 
compliance angle and will also provide specific 
reform suggestions that states can take to 
improve their use taxes.
The Use Tax Issue
The state use tax is relatively obscure 
among the general public but is likely known 
by readers of this publication, so its details will 
not be fully explored here. Nonetheless, some 
brief comments are helpful as we begin to 
think more broadly about the tax and its 
enforcement. To begin, discussions of the use 
tax often equate it to the tax owed on online 
purchases, but that is too narrow a 
characterization. The use tax is an integral part 
of the state system of consumption taxation, 
and the tax applies in a wide variety of 
situations.
In general, use tax is owed on any in-state 
consumption, and states allow credits against 
that tax for sales tax previously paid on the 
purchase of the consumed item. This system 
seeks to ensure that all in-state consumption 
(of taxable items) is subject to consumption tax 
regardless of where the purchase is made or 
whether tax is collected at the point of sale. In 
the days of National Bellas Hess4 and Quill, the 
tax often applied when consumers purchased 
items though catalogs. Today, online shopping 
often triggers the use tax, but the tax also 
applies in a number of other situations. The 
most common examples include the 
consumption of items purchased in a state 
with a lower sales-tax rate than the state of 
consumption and the consumption of items 
originally purchased tax free as business 
inputs or as inventory.5
Reminding ourselves that use taxes are 
about more than collecting revenue on internet 
sales is important because it helps to 
counteract attempts to marginalize their 
importance in the design of states’ tax systems. 
Use taxes are absolutely critical to the 
functioning of a broad-based consumption tax, 
at least for any such tax that is structured 
similar to the subnational retail sales taxes we 
have now. Opponents of sales and use tax 
reform sometimes use terms like “internet 
sales tax” to create the impression that there is 
a revenue grab at play in efforts to increase 
sales and use tax compliance.6 But the use tax 
has always been about shoring up a leaky 
consumption tax, and that has become more 
critical in recent years with sales tax avoidance 
becoming much easier and states relying more 
heavily on consumption taxes.7
What Is Being Done Today?
The traditional approach to use tax 
compliance has been to focus on getting 
vendors to collect taxes at the point of sale, and 
states have attempted a wide range of 
approaches in that vein. Some states have 
adopted statutes that attempt to fight entity 
isolation by attributing physical presences 
between related entities. Other states have 
adopted click-through nexus statutes that 
apply a Tyler Pipe-like8 attributional nexus 
regime to the digital world. A more recent 
approach is for states to impose information 
reporting obligations on noncollecting 
vendors, potentially making it more practical 
4
National Bellas Hess v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
5
For more robust discussions of the use tax and its applications, 
see Jerome R. Hellerstein and Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation, ch. 
16 (3d ed.); and Thimmesch, “Taxing Honesty,” supra note 2, at 155-
60.
6
Americans for Tax Reform, for example, has labeled the MFA a 
“huge internet sales tax.” See “The Marketplace Fairness Act: A 
Huge Internet Sales Tax,” Americans for Tax Reform (May 23, 
2017). More generally, some third-party organizations funded by 
and acting on behalf of some e-commerce retailers have 
campaigned against efforts to improve sales and use tax 
compliance and in doing so have promoted and exacerbated the 
misconception that some purchases are tax-exempt solely because 
those purchases were made on the internet.
7
Further, recent federal tax reform discussions have included 
considerations of a VAT or border-adjusted taxes, which both raise 
similar issues regarding cross-border transactions with required 
self-reporting. See, e.g., Brian Galle, “The Effect of a Federal DBCFT 
on U.S. States, and Vice-Versa: A Compromise Proposal,” 
Medium.com, Feb. 4, 2017; and David Gamage and Darien 
Shanske, “Tax Cannibalization and Fiscal Federalism in the United 
States,” 111 Nw. U.L. Rev. 295, 353-367 (2017).
8
Tyler Pipe Industries Inc. v. Washington Department of Revenue, 
483 U.S. 232 (1987).
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for those vendors to just collect the tax. States 
have also pushed for federal legislation like the 
Marketplace Fairness Act (MFA).9
Notwithstanding this focus on vendor-
centric approaches, states have not completely 
ignored consumers’ individual reporting 
obligations. Many states have included a line to 
report use tax on their income tax returns.10 
Some states make it even simpler for taxpayers 
to report use tax by providing tables that 
taxpayers can use to estimate their liabilities.11 
Other states have engaged in public education 
efforts.12 Together, those approaches have had 
some effect, but none have generated 
substantial levels of compliance. For instance, 
one study showed that the percentage of 
consumers who self-report use tax is less than 2 
percent.13 Based on that figure, it is clear why 
states have focused their attention on vendors.
The difficulties and inefficiencies of getting 
consumers to pay use tax of their own accord 
are not lost on us. Nevertheless, there are 
compelling reasons for states to try. These 
reasons include economic efficiency, concerns 
regarding the rule of law, and the impact of 
states’ efforts on tax compliance more generally. 
The first two of these reasons are discussed 
below, with a discussion of compliance saved 
for a follow-up essay.
The Economic Case for Consumer-Focused 
Use Tax Enforcement
It is clear why states have focused their use 
tax enforcement efforts on vendors — simple 
administrative efficiency. Collecting tax from 
vendors is much easier than doing so from their 
customers, one by one. Vendor-based collection 
approaches are not perfect, though, and they 
will leave significant uncollected revenue even 
if they are successful. Quite simply, states will 
never have completely unfettered power to 
require remote vendors to collect their taxes. 
Whether under their own statutes, the U.S. 
Constitution, or a federal statutory de minimis 
rule like that in the MFA,14 states will always 
rely to some extent on voluntary compliance by 
those who purchase goods from “smaller” 
online retailers or other retailers that the state 
cannot reach.
It might seem like few retailers would fall 
into those categories, but that is not necessarily 
the case. To begin, “small” retailers do a 
significant amount of commerce in the 
aggregate. One study estimated that online 
commerce by retailers that fall within the MFA’s 
small seller exception represents over 40 
percent of total annual online sales.15 Further, 
many of the large vendors that make the 
remaining sales already collect sales tax in 
many states. The study’s authors thus estimated 
that if passed, the MFA, with its small seller 
exception, would reduce the use tax gap by less 
than 50 percent.16 If those numbers are accurate, 
states will have to go further if they want to 
collect the taxes that are due.17
One other significant impediment to 
achieving a high level of tax compliance 
through vendor-centric approaches is the 
simplicity of retailer substitution by consumers. 
To the extent that consumers can shift their 
consumption to protected vendors, states’ 
revenue gains from expansions of their 
enforcement power will be reduced. 
Unfortunately for states, research suggests this 
9
That legislation would expand state authority, but not 
completely. The current bill contains a de minimis rule that would 
protect vendors with revenues of $1 million or less from remote 
sales in the preceding calendar year. Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 
976, section 2(c) (2017). For prior discussion of federal legislative 
approaches to the e-commerce sales and use tax problem, see 
Andrew J. Haile, Gamage, and Shanske, “A Potential Game 
Changer in E-Commerce Taxation,” State Tax Notes, Mar. 11, 2013, 
p. 747.
10
Thimmesch, “Testing the Models of Tax Compliance: The 






Nina Manzi, “Use Tax Collection on Income Tax Returns in 
Other States,” Minnesota House of Representatives Research 
Department (Apr. 2015).
14
See supra note 6.
15
Donald Bruce and William F. Fox, “An Analysis of Internet 
Sales Taxation and the Small Seller Exemption,” Small Business 




Consider, too, the impact of increasing the small seller 
exception, something that might be a natural bargaining chip by 
members of Congress looking to obtain additional votes on a bill. 
Using the additional authority granted under federal legislation 
would also require that states conform to any required 
simplification provisions. See Thimmesch, “Taxing Honesty,” supra 
note 2, at 164 (discussing the MFA’s simplification requirements). 
States unwilling to do so will be required to pursue other avenues.
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is already occurring.18 People who want to avoid 
paying tax on their online purchases are still 
shopping on Amazon.com; they are just buying 
from the small vendors that use the platform 
instead of from Amazon itself. Avoiding use tax 
often requires only one mouse click.
At the end of the day, the reality is that states 
should not be optimistic that the MFA, or 
similar legislation, will completely close the 
current use tax gap. Any legislative approach 
that contains a small seller exception will likely 
leave significant revenue beyond states’ reach, 
and consumer demand will flow to those 
protected zones. States will therefore always 
have an economic interest in taking consumer-
centric enforcement activities if they want to 
rely on consumption taxation to a substantial 
degree.
Moreover, the challenge posed by consumer 
compliance extends beyond state-level sales 
and use taxes. Even structurally superior 
consumption taxes, namely credit-invoice 
VATs, have increasing problems with 
compliance in connection with e-commerce.19 In 
that context, the OECD tells a familiar tale, 
noting that “private consumers have little 
incentive to declare and pay the tax due, at least 
in the absence of meaningful sanctions for 
failure to comply with such an obligation.”20 
The OECD’s approach to that problem has been 
to focus on vendor collection and to promote 
changes that would make VAT registration and 
compliance simpler.21 Nevertheless, it 
recognizes the need for proportionality and that 
smaller vendors may need protection from 
burdensome compliance costs.22 Thus, the 
OECD approach would also benefit from a 
complementary strategy to improve consumer 
compliance.
Furthermore, individual-level compliance 
is not just an issue for consumption taxes. It is 
commonly noted that compliance with the 
personal income tax is also tied to third-party 
solutions, particularly withholding, but also 
information reporting regimes.23 If it is true 
that we are entering the “gig economy,” then 
reliance on these types of mechanisms might 
ultimately be undermined in much the same 
way that the online economy undermined 
vendor collection. One response to this threat 
would be to put more obligations on even very 
small businesses, just as we might require such 
businesses to collect the use tax. Therefore, 
even as to the income tax, it seems that we 
should at least explore how we might get the 
individual taxpayers themselves to take a more 
meaningful role in compliance.
The Rule of Law Case for Use Tax Enforcement
The economic case for use tax enforcement 
is relatively tangible — states need revenue, 
and creating an online tax-free zone creates 
unwelcome economic distortions. The rule of 
law case is perhaps less apparent, but also 
compelling. The classic modern analysis of the 
components of the rule of the law comes from 
Lon Fuller.24 He claims that legal rules must 
18
Recent research shows that consumers respond quickly to the 
collection of tax by online retailers. See, e.g., Liran Einav et al., 
“Sales Taxes and Internet Commerce,” 104 Am. Econ. Rev. 1, 24 
(2014); Brian Baugh et al., “Can Taxes Shape an Industry: Evidence 
From Implementation of the Amazon Tax,” National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper 20052 (Apr. 2014); and see also 
Thimmesch, “Taxing Honesty,” supra note 2, at 165-166 (discussing 
these studies in further detail).
19
Walter Hellerstein, “An Introduction to the OECD’s 
International VAT/GST Guidelines,” 2016 J. of Tax’n 256, 262 (2016); 
and OECD, “International VAT/GST Guidelines,” paras 3.128–134.
20
OECD, supra note 19, at para 3.130.
21
Hellerstein, supra note 19, at 262–264; and OECD, supra note 
19, at paras 3.135-151.
22
OECD, supra note 19, at paras 3.150–151.
23
See generally Leandra Lederman, “Reducing Information Gaps 
to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is Information Reporting 
Warranted?” 78 Fordham L. Rev. 1733 (2010). It is worth noting here 
that problems with use tax enforcement are in many ways similar 
to the problems of enforcing income and payroll taxes in various 
sectors of the cash economy, with these problems giving rise to 
labels like “nanny taxes.” Just as labeling specific sales and use tax 
enforcement measures as “internet taxes” exacerbates the 
misconception that some purchases would otherwise be legally 
free of tax because they were made on the internet, labels like 
“nanny taxes” reflect confusion and misunderstanding about how 
income and payroll taxes apply in the context of payments for 
home care services. Like use taxes on e-commerce purchases, the 
payroll and income tax liabilities owed on payments for home care 
services have been notoriously difficult for tax agencies to enforce 
and collect due in part to ignorance and confusion about taxpayers’ 
legal obligations in this context.
24
To be clear, we are talking about the status of the use tax as 
law that should be respected in the first instance rather than 
potential arguments about the distribution of the use tax burden or 
of the inclusion of specific items in the tax base (e.g., the 
application of consumption tax to food or medication). Lon L. 
Fuller, The Morality of Law, 81–91 Yale University Press 2d ed. 
(1969). See also John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 238–239 Belknap 
Press (1971); and Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue,” The 
Authority of Law 210, 218 Oxford University Press (1979).
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meet eight conditions before they can be 
respected as law: They must be (1) generally 
applicable, (2) publicly available, (3) generally 
prospective in application, (4) understandable, 
(5) free of contradictions, (6) structured so that 
compliance is possible, (7) stable, and (8) 
administered consistent with their wording.25
Running through these eight features is the 
theme that there must be a reciprocal 
relationship between the governing and the 
governed.26 Acting in a manner that advances 
these eight features of a legal regime 
constitutes, for Fuller, the inner morality of law. 
Fuller is at pains to argue — and so are we — 
that this inner morality is not to be understood 
as a set of independent commandments as to 
what one should or should not do.27 Rather, 
these eight features indicate whether a legal 
regime is functioning well on its own terms. The 
current misfirings of the use tax illustrate 
Fuller’s point nicely.
To understand why, consider Fuller’s eighth 
requirement of a legal system: that there be 
congruence “between the law as declared and 
as actually administered.”28 State use tax laws 
are necessarily broad so that the use tax can 
serve as an effective backstop to the sales tax, 
but these laws are not regularly enforced 
against individual taxpayers. That creates an 
incongruity between the law as written and as 
enforced.
Of course, governments cannot perfectly 
enforce every law. Governments often have 
resource constraints that require them to focus 
on the biggest offenders or offenses.29 For 
example, the police are better served by 
dedicating efforts to prevent an assault than an 
incident of jaywalking. The nonpayment of use 
tax could easily be likened to the latter, and we 
have sometimes heard it discussed in that way. 
That account is understandable, but 
incomplete.
Unlike jaywalking or minor speeding, many 
states proclaim that enforcing use taxes is 
expected, and they signal that use taxes are 
every bit as important to them as income taxes. 
For example, many states have added use tax 
lines to their income tax returns,30 and their tax 
return instructions, websites, and other 
communications often discuss the necessity of 
reporting the tax.31 Some states’ voluntary 
disclosure programs also specifically reference 
use tax enforcement actions and individuals’ 
potential liabilities for taxes due in past years.32
These state communications are certainly 
warranted, but they create rule of law concerns 
because they urge compliance even though 
states take relatively few use tax enforcement 
actions against individual taxpayers. That 
incongruity is troubling partially because it 
means the burden of the use tax is borne 
primarily by the uninformed and the honest. 
This is a clear violation of our reciprocal 
obligations to one another. Yet this incongruity 
is also troubling because it is reinforcing a 
mixed message at a very inopportune time. As 
already explained, it is becoming ever more, not 
less, important that online commerce not be 
perceived as a rule-free zone.
Fuller also argues that proper laws require 
only actions that can be done. There can hardly 
be a reciprocal relationship between the 
government and the governed if the 
government continues to request impossible 
actions.33 This is another issue for use tax 
compliance. How many people could 
accurately report their use taxes even if they 
wanted to?
25
Fuller, The Morality of Law, Yale University Press 1st ed. (1964).
26
We will focus on the psychology of taxpayer compliance in 
our next piece, though clearly there is a relationship between a 
reciprocal relationship and whether there is compliance.
27
In other words, our argument is not reliant on whether the 
positive law here is consistent with some higher law. (Our position 
on whether there is a higher law is complicated.)
28
Fuller, supra note 25, at 81.
29
This applies to laws ranging from traffic laws to criminal law 
to immigration laws. It also includes the tax laws. See Leigh 
Osofsky, “Concentrated Enforcement,” 16 Fla. Tax Rev. 325, 333–338 
(2014) (discussing the use of worst-first enforcement strategies).
30
One important thing to keep in mind is that tax returns 
generally include a jurat that requires taxpayers to attest to the 
accuracy of the return under penalties of perjury. Perjury is, of 
course, a serious crime and often a felony. See Thimmesch, “Taxing 




Id. at 171 n.117.
33
See Fuller, supra note 24; and Michael Neumann, The Rule of 
Law: Politicizing Ethics, 56-57 Ashgate (2002).
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Of course, compliance is technically possible 
for taxpayers who carefully track, examine, 
and recall every transaction. But the level of 
effort required to be able to attest that one is 
reporting correctly under penalties of perjury 
is unreasonably high, given the dollars at stake 
for many individual consumers. If states want 
to generate a climate where taxpayers take 
their tax obligations more seriously, the 
current situation is untenable.
Fuller maintains that when a government’s 
actions constitute a significant enough 
deviation from his eight criteria, then that 
action is hardly a law at all. State use tax laws 
have not fallen quite so far, but they clearly 
represent a troubling deviation from the ideal. 
This is easy to see if one simply imagines the 
state of affairs if all laws had the congruence 
and compliance issues of state use tax laws.
Where to Go From Here?
The economic and rule of law considerations 
discussed above suggest that states’ current focus 
on getting vendors to collect their use taxes is 
insufficient. That isn’t to say those efforts are in 
error, just that they are not enough. If states want 
a use tax that serves as an effective, lawful 
backstop to their sales taxes, then states must also 
focus on the consumer side of the equation and on 
how they administer their use taxes. We will 
explain what states might do to improve this 
situation in a future essay on this topic.
For now, though, it is worth emphasizing that 
our argument that states should focus more on 
consumer-level compliance efforts in no way 
implies that states should abandon vendor-level 
compliance efforts. Indeed, it is our view that 
consumer-level and vendor-level compliance 
efforts can mutually reinforce one another and 
that these two levels of effort work best in 
tandem.34 
34
This is partly because the current ignorance and confusion 
about use tax responsibilities on the part of many consumers 
creates a chicken-and-egg problem for state enforcement efforts. 
Greater consumer-level enforcement is a necessary part of getting 
consumers to understand their use tax obligations and to take these 
obligations more seriously. But state tax enforcement agencies are 
understandably reluctant to take more than limited enforcement 
actions against consumers within the current environment in 
which so many consumers commit use tax evasion out of confusion 
and ignorance rather than doing so purposefully. Consequently, 
enforcement measures aimed at improving the communications 
about sales and use tax responsibilities that consumers see from 
vendors at the time of purchase must be a key component of 
consumer-level enforcement efforts. Some e-commerce vendors 
have acted in ways that exacerbate consumers’ misconceptions 
about sales and use tax responsibilities. At a minimum, increased 
state-level regulation and enforcement actions are needed to 
combat these unhelpful actions by vendors.
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